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Peace
in Our Time Following the Munich Conference in September 1938, Adolf Hitler and Neville Chamberlain signed a separate agreement between Germany and Great Britain never to go to war again in the event of disagreement between the two countries. On his arrival back in England Neville Chamberlain brandished the document calling it `Peace in Our Time ´ . THE MUNICH CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 29, 1938. The following is a brief account (written from memory) of the meetings at Munich which resulted in the Agreement of Four Powers (Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy) for the settlement of the Czechoslovak question. [ The organisation of the Conference was very imperfect, and there appeared to be no arrangements for the taking of notes. A Secretary - General had been appointed, but he took no part in the Conference for the first hour of five hours, and was only one unit in the chaos that ruled for the last five hours. ] On arrival at Munich aerodrome at noon on the 29th September we were at once taken by car to the ` Führer House´ and were informed that arrangements had been made to begin the conference at once. After a short ceremonial meeting, the Conference assembled at 12.30. Those present were : Germany - Herr Hitler . Herr Ribbentrop. Herr von Weizsäcker. France - The French Prime Minister. M. Léger. Great Britain - The Prime Minister. Sir Horace Wilson. Italy - Signor Mussolini. Count Ciano. Herr Schmidt - Interpreter. (Sir Nevile Henderson and Sir William Malkin joined the Conference later in the day.)
It was, however, the turn of M. Daladier to speak first, and to our relief he at once said he was prepared to adopt Signor Mussolini's document as a basis for discussion. This was agreed. It then being proposed to take the memorandum clause by clause, the Prime Minister said he was willing to accept Clause 1, but he wanted to discuss carefully Clause 2. This clause proposed that we should guarantee that the Czechoslovak Government should complete evacuation by the 10th October, ` without existing installations having been destroyed. ´ The Prime Minister pointed out that he could not give such a guarantee for a number of reasons, one being that there had been no opportunity to ascertain how far, if at all, the Czech Government were or would be disposed to consent. This led to a tirade by Herr Hitler (who was otherwise calm throughout most of the Conference), his line being that if - having asked him to stay his hand - we were not prepared to take the responsibility we were not prepared to take the responsibility of ensuring the concurrence of Czechoslovakia we had better let him resume his way ! He was, in due course, soothed, and there then followed an effort, lasting for more than half an hour, to explain that - whatever others might feel - we regarded the word ` guarantee ´ as meaning a good deal. In the course of this discussion the Prime Minister raised the question of the representation at the Conference of the Czech Government. The conclusion was reached that the heads of the four Powers must accept responsibility for deciding - in the circumstances - how the situation should be dealt with. Eventually we adjourned to reduce to written words what we meant, and we produced a revised edition of this memorandum (revised edition of this memorandum (Appendix B) containing a preamble (to introduce general responsibility) and an amended Clause 2 to show that the Czechs in turn would be held responsible. Then followed the first of what proved to be a long series of to - ings and fro - ings to the other three delegations, first to explain to them what it meant and then to persuade them to agree. Thereafter - at 3.15 - followed an interval for lunch at our hotel and for reflection, with orders to be back at 4.30 ! We arranged with the French delegation to come to us at 3.45, but they failed us. During lunch we drafted a list of points to be settled. [ In the meantime arrangements had been made for the Czech Minister at Berlin (M. Mastny) and M. Krofta's private secretary (M. Masarik) (who had flown from Prague) to be available at the hotel in the evening. It proved to be impossible for me to see them until 10 P.M. (after a late meal during the evening adjournment for dinner), and I then explained to them the position as it had so far developed, giving them a copy of the map showing the proposed stages of occupation. ] On resuming the Conference at 4.30 the Prime Minister endeavoured to secure progress by concentrating upon the two immediate questions - what was to be the area to be occupied on the 1st October and what was the extent of the area to be occupied by the 10th October, i.e. , up to what line? Thanks, however, to an intervention by M. Daladier, the discussion wandered to and fro over Clauses 3 and 4 of this memorandum and over a number of other matters, and it was not until nearly 7 o'clock that we heard what were the German proposals for evacuation and occupation. During this time the Italians produced a minorities draft (Appendix C) which we could not accept, as it seemed to imply, by the use of the words ` the same principles, ´ that we were agreeing to the display of force for the transfer to Poland and to Hungary of the ` Polish ´ and ` Magyar ´ areas. We prepared a new draft (Appendix D) and secured its acceptance. The German proposals for evacuation and occupation surprised us by their moderation and by the degree of latitude which they left to the International Commission. They were explained in detail by Herr Hitler by reference to a map, copies of which we were given. The next hour was spent in a prolonged argument between the French and German Delegations about the Brun ` neck ´ and the fortifications south of Glatz. Eventually the two Delegations agreed upon a form of words which was subsequently embodied in the last part of Article 6 of the main Agreement. After a short adjournment for dinner, agreement was reached upon the evacuation areas and upon the time - table. We inserted in the preamble words to show that the Conference had been working in the light of the fact that it had already been agreed in principle that the Sudeten German areas should be ceded. We also secured the opting clause(Article 7). Meanwhile a Drafting Committee had been set up (Sir William Malkin representing us) and though they had no time for a proper revision, in due course they produced a less untidy document. The French Delegation then produced an ` individual and collective ´ guarantee proposal which we felt unable to accept (no copy available). This was eventually abandoned in favour of one prepared by Sir William Malkin. This draft, with a minor amendment, was accepted by Count Ciano (who proved helpful) and by Signor Mussolini and was then agreed by Herr Hitler . It emerged as shown in the first annex to the Agreement. Earlier in the Conference, when Article 2 was under discussion, we had suggested that any damage done to ` installations ´ could be deducted to compensation due from Germany to Czechoslovakia, for State property, loans, & c. This led to an outburst from Herr Hitler who repeated the statements he made at Godesberg as to this property (so far as it is new) being built out of the proceeds of the additional taxation levied upon Sudeten Germans during the last twenty years. He denied that any compensation was due to Czechoslovakia. During dinner we had prepared and sent into the Drafting Committee a short clause (no copy available) providing that financial and currency questions arising out of the transfer of the territory should be referred for settlement to a German – Czech Commission with a neutral Chairman. On returning to the Führer House I learnt that this was unacceptable to the Germans (Herr von Ribbentrop in evidence) and that all that Sir William Malkin had been able to arrange was that the draft clause should come up to the Conference as a separate paper. When the draft Agreement came before the Conference this clause was absent. (On enquiry I was told (a) that it was not agreed and (b) that the draft we had sent in had been lost.) We took a stand on this, pointing out that there must be a number of questions - property, currency, outstanding loans, & c. - of the kind contemplated by the draft clause. Eventually a way out was found by a clause (the Supplementary Declaration) providing that all questions arising out of the transfer shall be considered as coming within the terms of reference to the International Commission. After very long delays due to inefficient organisation and lack of control, the Agreement and supplementaries were signed a little before 2 A.M. on the 30th September, and the proceedings concluded by brief expressions of satisfaction. During the many tedious waits the Prime Minister had some useful conversations with Mussolini and with Count Ciano. Then arose the question, what to do about the Czechs? It was agreed that each Government should transmit the Agreement to the Czech Government. The French and ourselves, however, had a special interest. M. Daladier declined a suggestion that he should take the Agreement to Prague. It was decided that he and the Prime Minister should together see the Czech representative (who had meantime been waiting at our hotel), and accordingly a meeting took place in the Prime Minister's room about 2.15. I gave M. Daladier the prepared copy (with map) so that he might hand it to M. Mastny. M. Mastny read it and asked a number of questions. He was given a pretty broad hint that - having regard to the seriousness of the alternative - the best course was for his Government to accept what was clearly a considerable improvement upon the German Memorandum. He and his colleagues said they would fly to Prague and at once place the documents before their Government. We agreed with the French the instructions to go to our respective Ministers at Prague. We sent Mr. Ashton - Gwatkin to Prague with the two Czechs so that he could both carry the instructions to Mr. Newton and add the necessary background. He was also to enquire about the international forces. It interested us to note that at no time during the Conference did the German representatives raise the question of Czech foreign policy, nor was Russia mentioned. H. J. W. October 1, 1938. APPENDIX A TO 6. (Provisional Translation.) Proposals submitted by the Head of the Italian Government . The cession, in principle, of the entire Sudeten - Germany territory ( cf. Map attached to German memorandum) to the Reich shall take place under the following conditions, subject to corrections which may ultimately result from the plebiscite in the doubtful territories : - (1) Evacuation to begin on the 1st October. (2) The Guarantor Powers, England, France and Italy, will guarantee to Germany that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 10th October, without any existing installations having been destroyed. (3) The conditions governing the evacuation shall be laid down in detail by an international committee in which Germany, England, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia are represented. (4) Doubtful territories will be occupied by international forces until the plebiscite has been completed. Under the terms of the Memorandum the conditions of the Saar Plebiscite shall be considered as forming the basis of the plebiscite. The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by an international committee. (5) The occupation, by stages, of the predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on the 1st October. APPENDIX B TO 6. The four Powers have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the cession of the Sudeten - German territory and the measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfilment : - (1) Evacuation to begin on the 1st October. (2) The Powers, England, France and Italy, agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 10th October, without any existing installations having been destroyed, and the Czech Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage as aforesaid. (3) The conditions governing the evacuation shall be laid down in detail by an international committee, in which Germany, England, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia are represented. (4) Doubtful territories will be occupied by international forces until the plebiscite has been completed. Under the terms of the Memorandum, the conditions of the Saar Plebiscite shall be considered as the basis of the Plebiscite. The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by an international committee. (5) The occupation, by stages, of the predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on the 1st October. APPENDIX C TO 6. The heads of the Governments of the four Powers declare the same principles which have permitted the solution of the problem of the Sudeten Germans should be adopted also for the analogous problems of the Polish and Magyar minorities within a maximum delay of one month and according to a procedure which could be eventually fixed through the usual diplomatic channels or by means of another meeting of the heads of the Governments of the four Powers here present. APPENDIX D TO 6. The heads of the Governments of the four Powers declare that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities, if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective Governments, shall form the subject of another meeting of the heads of the Governments of the four Powers here present. 7. NOTE OF A CONSERVATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND HERR HITLER, SEPTEMBER 30 , AT THE LATTER'S FLAT IN MUNICH. PRIME MINISTER : He was very pleased at the result of yesterday's proceedings, and he hoped that Herr Hitler was equally happy. HERR HITLER : He was particularly happy, especially that the hopes of many millions of Germans had now been fulfilled and that the 3 1 / 2 millions of Sudeten Germans were now going to be once more secure. Their sufferings had indeed been terrible, but now they would be the happiest of all about the result of the conference. In this connection he would like to thank the British Prime Minister once more for his great efforts to bring about a peaceful solution. The most difficult problem of all had now been concluded and his own main task had been happily fulfilled. PRIME MINISTER : He warmly appreciated Herr Hitler's words , but there was now something he wished to say to him by way of an appeal. He had been told that Herr Hitler intended, if the Czechs accepted the proposals, to treat them very generously. This was what he (the Prime Minister) would have expected from Herr Hitler, but he was obliged to consider the possibility that the Czech Government might be mad enough to refuse the terms and attempt resistance. In such an eventuality he wanted to ask Herr Hitler to make sure that nothing should be done which would diminish the high opinion of him which would be held throughout the world in consequence of yesterday's proceedings. In particular, he trusted that there would be no bombardment of Prague or killing of women and children by attacks from the air. HERR HITLER : Before answering that specific question, he would like to say something on a point of principle. Years ago he made proposals for the restriction of the use of the air arm. He himself fought in the Great War and has a personal knowledge of what air bombardment means. It had been his intention, if he had to use force, to limit air action to front line zones as a matter of principle, but even if the Czechs were mad enough to reject the terms and he had consequently to take forcible action, he would always try to spare the civilian population and to confine himself to military objectives. He hated the thought of little babies being killed by gas bombs. THE PRIME MINISTER : He thanked Herr Hitler for these assurances and would now turn to another matter. He wished to report to him a conversation which he had had the previous evening with Signor Mussolini on the subject of Spain. He had suggested to the Duce the possibility that the Four Great Powers might call upon the two sides in Spain to establish an armistice and that they might offer their services in assisting them to arrive at a settlement of their differences. The Duce had said, in reply, that he was tired of Spain. (Here Herr Hitler laughed heartily .) He had lost 50,000 men there ; Franco had time and again thrown away his opportunities of securing a victory. He, Mussolini, was no longer afraid of Bolshevistic domination. He had never had any territorial aims in Spain, and it was his intention shortly to withdraw a considerable body of Italians. As to the suggestion, the Duce had expressed his intention of thinking it over. Had the Führer anything to say upon this subject? HERR HITLER : First of all he desired to repeat what he had many times said before, that Germany had no territorial ambitions in Spain, and that all these rumours about her desiring to occupy Morocco or any other territory were pure invention. He had only supported Franco against bolshevism, of which they had had experience in Munich. He did not know whether it was true that the danger of Communism in Spain was over (here the Prime Minister interjected : ` The Duce says so ´ ), and he did not know how it would be possible to induce the two parties to agree to a truce, but he agreed with Mussolini that the end of the Spanish conflict would be welcome, and he would be delighted to withdraw the few German volunteers who were there as soon as ever the others were willing to do the same. If Spain were to become Communist, he feared that the infection would spread to France, from France to Belgium, from Belgium to Holland, and one did not know where it would stop. THE PRIME MINISTER : he too did not know how a truce could be secured, but he had thought that if the two sides received a call from the Four Great Powers they might well be induced to listen and that, once the truce had been called, the Powers might be able to help in getting a settlement. However, he only now wished to report to the Führer what had passed between himself and Mussolini on this subject and he hoped that the Führer too would give it his personal attention. HERR HITLER assented. THE PRIME MINISTER : Whenever they began to talk about future Anglo - German relations, no doubt the Führer would have some requests to make and he would not be surprised if, in turn, the Prime Minister asked something from him. (Here the Führer smiled broadly.) He was oppressed by the thought of the increasing burden which was being imposed upon all countries by the expenditure upon armaments, which was eating up the capital which ought to be employed on building houses, on better food and on improving the health of the people. Accordingly he had listened with sympathy to Herr Hitler's views on the restriction of air action, but it seemed to him that the difficulty was in inducing people to believe that agreements to abstain from air bombardment would in fact be carried out in practice. They could see to - day both in Spain and China how women and children and civilians were being blown to pieces by aerial bombing, but whenever a protest was made to those responsible for this bombing they replied always that they had been aiming at military objectives and that the civilians had suffered because of their proximity to them. Several efforts had been made in the past to bring about disarmament, but only one of them had been at all effective, namely, that which began as the Washington Treaty and was continued in London, in which the tonnage of warships and the calibre of their guns was limited. Basing his views on this experience, he concluded that the qualitative method of restricting armaments was the one which had the most practical results and, moreover, had the additional advantage that it was more easy to control. It was much more possible to see that a country was not constructing bigger weapons than it had agreed to than it was to make sure that it was not constructing more such weapons. Bombing from the air had now become a highly specialised affair for which machines with specialised devices and instruments had been developed, and it was no longer possible to maintain that it was of no use to abolish the bombing machine because bombs could still be dropped from civilian machines. It was true that bombs could be dropped from any machine in the air, but to make an effective military use of them it was nowadays necessary to use the highly specialised instrument which had been devised for this purpose. Therefore the abolition of bombing aircraft seemed to him to be the practical thing to agree upon. He knew what the Führer would say in reply to this proposal. He would say that it would be all very well if he were dealing only with him or with France and Italy, but there was Russia and Russia would not agree. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the perfection which had been reached by the modern fighter machine and also the pitch of efficiency to which Herr Hitler had brought his anti - aircraft defences, and bearing also in mind that in future he need no longer regard Czechoslovakia as a starting - off place for Russian aggression, could he not feel that Russia could be left out of account? HERR HITLER : The situation about air disarmament is just the same as it is in the case of the naval situation. If a single nation refuses to agree, al the others have to follow her example. One sees what has happened in the case of the Naval Treaty. When Japan refused to agree, all the other nations had to give up their restriction. It would be just the same if one tried to abolish bombing aircraft. It could only be accepted if all did the same. He himself had proposed years ago - 1. The abolition of bombing aircraft ; 2. If ` 1 ´ could not be accepted, the abolition of bombing outside a zone of 15 to 20 kilom. from the front line ; and 3. If neither ` 1 ´ not ` 2 ´ were accepted, the limitation of bombing to a zone which could be reached by heavy artillery. He himself was particularly attached to ` 1, ´ which was, in his view, in line with the Geneva Agreement providing for the exemption of non - combatants from the effects of warfare. The development of bombing from the air extends the horrors of war to the non - combatant population and is therefore a barbarism. Modern bombers have a range from 6,000 to 8,000 kilom. Unlike Germany, whose ideology is confined to herself, Russia's ideology is an article for export. Poland intervenes geographically between Germany and Russia, but he had no very clear idea of her powers of resistance. The same is the case with Romania [ sic ] . As to Czechoslovakia, he did not know whether the Czechs had changed their mind, but they had only got to prepare a few landing grounds and it would be possible for Russia to land from 2,000 to 4,000 machines in a space of from two to three hours. One ought not to over - estimate the effectiveness of anti - aircraft defences and devices, especially in the case of Germany, where her vulnerable industrial establishments were so close to the frontier that they could be destroyed before the anti - aircraft defences had adequate warning to put themselves into operation. To give practical effect to the Prime Minister's suggestion, it would be necessary to effect an all - round international agreement. THE PRIME MINISTER : Then it is understood that Herr Hitler does not exclude the participation of Germany in such an agreement by the nations which, to be universal, would, of course, mean the assent of Russia and in turn of Japan. HERR HITLER : The most universal measure ever taken for the limitation of armaments was the Red Cross agreement when the Powers decided that they would not revert to actions which used to be, at one time, general, such as the killing of prisoners, & c. It was only possible because the whole world agreed to it. THE PRIME MINISTER : He would now leave this question and turn to another, namely, the relations between Germany and South - Eastern Europe. He had read expressions of German opinion indicating a suspicion that England desired not a military but an economic encirclement of Germany. This was a suspicion which, if entertained, was without foundation. He, however, desired to see an improvement in international trade. Yesterday's proceedings would certainly ease the political tension, but something more positive was required in the economic sphere and he would particularly like to see a relaxation in the restrictions on international trade which now existed. Had the Führer any suggestions to make on this subject? HERR HITLER : In South - Eastern Europe German relations were economic, but there were no political ties. These economic relations were quite natural because Germany is a great producer of industrial articles and a large consumer of raw materials and foodstuffs. The Balkan States are the other way round. They produce the primary products and consume industrial articles. The greatest difficulties which Germany had experienced with the United States were because Germany was willing to import raw materials and food from the United States, but the United States could not accept payment in the only form which was possible to Germany, namely, the export of industrial goods, because the United States was herself an immense producer of these goods and at the time had 12,000,000 unemployed. That was why Germany had been unable to settle her difficulties with the United States. One day, but not now when there was so little time, he would like very much to have a full discussion with the Prime Minister on these economic problems. His own idea for the reconstruction of world economy was that it should not be on an artificial basis, but that it should be founded on national exchanges between primary producers and producers of industrial goods. International trade could not be permanently improved by artificial means such as tariffs and loans. He wanted a continuous flow of the exchange production of raw materials against industrial products, and that his theory was not wrong was shown by the fact that there was in Germany a considerable internal prosperity, and this was due to the fact that he had organised this exchange on the lines he had indicated. THE PRIME MINISTER : It certainly would be interesting some day to have a talk about this profoundly important problem, and he would only say now that it seemed to him that there was a considerable difference between the internal conditions in Germany, which were under a strict central control, and the regulation of the relations between different countries where there was no such control. Moreover, he would have thought that, even if Herr Hitler's theories were not only correct but capable of being put into practice, there would still be required loans to facilitate this flow into the two directions mentioned by Herr Hitler. Now, he would not keep Herr Hitler any longer, but he wished to say that he thought it would be a pity if this meeting passed off with nothing more than a settlement of the Czech question, which had been agreed upon yesterday. What he had in mind was to suggest to Herr Hitler that it would be helpful to both countries and to the world in general if they could issue some statement which showed the agreement between them on the desirability of better Anglo - German relations, leading to a greater European stability. Accordingly, he had ventured to draft a short statement which he would now ask Herr Hitler to read and to consider whether he would be disposed to issue such a statement over the signatures of himself and the Prime Minister to the public. As these observations were translated to Herr Hitler he ejaculated at intervals ` Ja ! Ja ! ´ and when it was finished he said he would certainly agree to sign this document. When did the Prime Minister wish to do so? THE PRIME MINISTER : Immediately. HERR HITLER : Then let us sign. At this point, they both rose, went to a writing table and, without any further words, appended their signatures to the document (copy attached as Appendix), of which the Prime Minister handed Herr Hitler one copy to keep and retained the other. APPENDIX TO 7. We, the German Führer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting to - day and are agreed in recognising that the question of Anglo - German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe. We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo - German naval agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again. We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe. (Signed) A. Hitler (Signed) Neville Chamberlain September 30, 1938.Neville Chamberlain
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